Aideed from 1816 to 1821, this article traces how EIC legal authority became pervasive at the eastern end of the Indian Ocean by the early nineteenth century without actual territorial conquest. 1 The EIC commercial court in the sole settlement in Penang played a key role in the consolidation of EIC control of the Straits of Malacca in the absence of a strong military presence. 2 Law, as Samera Esmeir argues, was a colonizing force. 3 This phenomenon becomes apparent when the perspective shifts from normative orders to jurisdictional conflicts that propelled change in the political and legal structure of colonial legal orders over the course of the nineteenth century. 4 Because the emergence of a new EIC legal forum in the Straits of Malacca actually occurred while older forms of authority were still vying for power, a shift to jurisdictional perspective makes it possible to trace the changing legal expectations of historical actors during this period of transition. Over time, the EIC managed to extend its jurisdiction over the region not by conquering territory per se, but by drawing clients into commercial court. Legal authority was not bound territorially, and the tie between sovereign and subject was defined as a legal relationship. 5 
EIC Commercial Court
Legal proceedings in EIC commercial courts in Penang flattened social and political hierarchies in the region. Like their counterparts in South Asia, EIC authorities recognized that the kingship was the organizing principle of society that persisted well into the age of EIC rule in the Straits of Malacca. 6 Because kings in the Straits of Malacca derived political power from their mercantile wealth and vice versa, there were several contenders to any throne, with several sources of power not limited to biological lineage. 7 This phenomenon entailed a complicated process of "hollowing the crown," because there were overlapping systems of patronage and rule with divided or ambiguous loyalties. 8 By holding kings or potential kings accountable for their commercial dealings in EIC legal courts, EIC authorities were able to gradually impose structural changes in the Straits of Malacca.
EIC subjugation and discrediting of Malay rulers in the Straits of Malacca was conducted through commercial lawsuits in the nineteenth century. 9 After 1805, all EIC employees in Penang were forbidden to conduct private trade on their own account. 10 Thereafter, more merchants, including including local rulers who were mostly merchants, fell into the orbit of the EIC. All sovereign princes in the region were treated as private individuals when they conducted trade with the EIC. By 1843, this was established as a system to discredit local kings. The headnote of a law report in 1843 stated that: "A foreign Sovereign Prince, who remains in [the Straits Settlements] for a protracted time, is entitled to no greater exemption from the jurisdiction of the Courts of this Colony. . . and if he engages in mercantile transactions. . . such as borrowing money in his private capacity, on a promissory note, he is liable to be sued thereon in such Courts, and cannot claim exemption on the grounds of his being a Sovereign Prince." 11 In other words, the status of Malay rulers as royal sovereigns was disregarded in commercial lawsuits. Subjugating local kings to EIC laws certainly chipped away at their authority. Legal scholars have demonstrated how separate legal forums for different ethnic and religious communities were established in the form of state-sanctioned legal pluralism enforced from above under the umbrella of English Common Law from the late nineteenth century onwards. 12 This article demonstrates how the roots of legal pluralism were planted by the EIC during the early nineteenth century with the establishment of the first Straits Settlement of Penang. 13 Because litigants and witnesses in the port city of Penang were often of different ethnicities and religious faiths, separate jurisdictions for commercial cases were not the most effective sites for adjudication. The EIC court became the logical site for settling disputes among merchants of various faiths and origins. The authority of legal forums no longer emanated from the personal authority of powerful individuals such as Syed Hussain. Henceforth, legal pluralism became embedded in colonial state institutions that policed the boundaries of manifestations of law, thereby establishing a normative order that could reach beyond its actual narrow jurisdiction on the island of Penang.
Scholars have focused on political, economic, and administrative strategies of the EIC vis-à-vis local rulers in Southeast Asia. 14 Penang was established as an EIC settlement to counter the dominance of the Dutch East India Company also known as the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) in the region. 15 The VOC had already attempted to dominate the Straits from their port city in Malacca since 1641, but their influence had declined by the end of the eighteenth century. Prior to the EIC settlement in Penang, the EIC had already established a garrison in Bencoolen (Bengkulu) in southwest Sumatra in 1685, and later erected Fort 12. A legal system is pluralistic in the juristic sense when the sovereign commands different bodies of law for different groups of the population varying by ethnicity, religion, nationality, or geography, and when the parallel legal regimes are all dependent on the state legal system. Sally E. Merry, "Legal Pluralism," Law and Society 25 The status of Penang vis-à-vis Bengal remained precarious until 1826. The EIC governors of Bengal adopted an inattentive policy toward Penang because it was "not a naval base or a political objective. . . but a bazaar." 26 Lukewarm Bengal support for Penang became manifest only through Regulations of 1794, an informal set of laws requested from Bengal, but even these regulations could not be formally enacted. 27 Perhaps to momentarily appease Penang authorities, the advocate-general of Bengal claimed in 1800 that the governor-general of Bengal was 27. It was only in 1799 that the EIC government in Bengal recognized the value of Penang, after attempts to establish a base in the Andaman islands were finally abandoned in 1796, and after an expedition to Manila was authorized to enact laws, civil and criminal, for the government of Penang in the same manner as he did for the Province of Bengal. 28 Strictly speaking however, the Indian government based in Calcutta had no jurisdiction in Penang. 29 Deprived of Bengal's influence and patronage, EIC servants in Penang nonetheless forged their imperial presence on Penang soil by introducing English forms of law and policy. They replicated the structure of the EIC legal system within Penang, and its understanding of legality. In this way, they followed what they believed to be the most legitimate route to establish a "regional governance regime" in the Straits of Malacca that mimicked the EIC in Bengal. 30 Although EIC officials in Penang delegated legal authority to local leaders, and established close relationships with local merchants, they never crossed outside of the legal hierarchical boundaries of the firm. Their legitimacy in Penang was derived from the firm. EIC officials in Penang were empowered by the overarching EIC legal system, which had yet to formally recognize them. Similar to EIC officials in South Asia examined elsewhere by Philip Stern, the new Penang EIC government was preoccupied with the exercise of political and juridical power, because they believed that firm sovereignty should be buffered by stable legal institutions. 31 In this way, law was an element in political strategies. 32 In 1805, Penang achieved presidency status, separate from Bengal, on a par with Madras and Bombay. which granted the EIC government in Penang with limited powers to form rules and regulations. 33 later, the first legal court was created by king's charter in the form of a recorder's court presided over by Sir Edmond Stanley with the governor and three councilors on the bench. 34 However, the court was not legally allowed to rule on cases involving political sovereignty, because of lack of support from Bengal. In addition, without a court of admiralty, the EIC could not rule on cases of possible crimes committed on the high seas. 35 However, EIC authorities were able to assert authority over the Straits of Malacca by providing an effective legal forum for merchants in cases involving commercial affairs, especially unpaid debts. It is through these trials that the most politically powerful men in the Straits of Malacca entered the orbit of the EIC, effectively subjugating themselves to English law in a colonial court that disregarded their sovereign status, preferring to take into account only their mercantile dealings. In this way, EIC court became instrumental in weakening the hold of indigenous rulers in the region, most of whom were merchants themselves, and were, therefore, not only political rivals, but also mercantile rivals to the EIC. One of these powerful merchants was the Arab merchant Syed Hussain Aideed, identified by EIC legal authorities in 1816 as "the principal native resident and the head of the Mahomedans and considered the most opulent and powerful native in the island." 36 By 1816, he was also a "native British subject." 37 He arrived from Kuala Kedah on the Peninsula only 3 years after Francis Light established a British settlement on the island in 1786. 38 34. The charter came partly in response to a request by the secretary to the Government of Penang to remove John Dickens from his position because he was a difficult character to work with, further evidence that executive government rarely saw eye to eye with the judicial branch. Penang Past and Present, 1786-1963 (Penang: City Council, 1966), 9-10.
35. This was a huge disadvantage, considering that piracy was rampant in the Straits of Malacca. Arabs, especially descendants of the Prophet such as Syed Hussain Aideed, enjoyed much prestige in the Malay world and were often associated with members of royalty. 39 Although Syed Hussain was of Arab descent, neither he nor EIC authorities regarded him as separate from local Malays. 40 Intermarriage among Arabs, Indian Muslims, and Malays were so common in the region that the category of "Arabs" was subsumed under "Malays" in EIC censuses. Hussain was the leader (kapitan) of both the Arab and Malay communities on the island.
At the end of 1791, Syed Hussain Aideed, together with a Malay chief known as Datuk Penggawa Muda, sent a letter to Francis Light written in the format of a treaty with four clauses, which named highly specific possible cases without any general applicable principles. 41 They stated that Muslim inhabitants had the power to pass jurisdiction within their own community, unencumbered by English law, if they so desired. They also emphasized that if the Muslim inhabitants of Penang were not pleased with the arrangements in the new EIC settlement, they should be free to change things as they wished. Second, quarrels between Muslims were to be settled between Muslims, but quarrels between Chinese (presumably non-Muslim Chinese) and EIC-employed sepoys for example, were to be settled by the superintendent of Penang. 42 The treaty was silent on disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims. This omission proved to be detrimental for Syed Hussain Aideed, because the EIC would later determine that cases involving Muslims and non-Muslims should be tried in EIC commercial court. 41. The agreement or treaty sent by Syed Hussain was written in a neat, refined, and careful hand. It was, however, devoid of the numerous compliments found in his later letters to Francis Light and his successors. Also, the letter lacks a decorative heading, which adorned most letters sent to Francis Light from Malay rulers and merchants in the region. The letter was also missing a seal, or a "chop," which would indicate the sender's identity. It was clearly, therefore, not intended to be an ordinary letter from one official to another. The treaty refers to four distinct matters enumerated in a logical and matter-of-fact manner. SOAS University of London Library MS 40320/11, f. The third clause stated that if a thief entered someone's home and was killed by the owner of that home, then there will be "no more talk of it" (literal translation of the Malay expression "tiada suatu bicaranya"), indicating a strong desire for noninterference from EIC authorities. Similarly, if someone committed mischief against one's wife, and was killed, there would also be no more talk of it. Finally, if a slave refused to follow orders, and fought back (either verbally or physically), and was killed accidentally, by God's will, then there would also be no more talk of it. If the slave was ill-behaved ("jahat") which made the master hit him, chain him, or tie him up, there would also be no more talk of it.
This letter was a request to Francis Light to allow the Muslim community in Penang to be directly answerable to him in all matters, not just in social or religious matters, but also in matters of criminal law that entailed capital punishment. 43 However, because of the high level of specificity in all four clauses elucidated in the treaty, it is not possible to derive any abstract legal principles. 44 Hence, general applicable laws could not be imposed from this set of clauses. Syed Hussain was intent on protecting his jurisdiction rather than expanding it, and, therefore, saw no need to extrapolate general laws from these very particular clauses. His lack of ambition to create his own regional governance regime rendered his jurisdiction precarious. Unless a legal case fulfilled one of the particular circumstances contained in each clause, it is highly possible that the case might fall out of his jurisdiction.
Syed Hussain was also a descendant of an Acehnese king who ruled in the eighteenth century. After moving to Penang from Kuala Kedah, Syed Hussain maintained his links to Aceh carefully cultivated through his shahbandar or harbormaster, Haji Abdul Rahim, and another prominent Arab merchant named Syed Salim. 45 Their support, as well as that of other EIC and country traders in the Straits of Malacca, would play a key role in his efforts to dethrone the less friendly incumbent king Jauhar Alam in Aceh. Their backing greatly aided him in achieving legitimacy in his efforts to wrest control of Aceh. Syed Hussain's royal and Arab lineages, authority, and wealth provided him with credit, both financially and symbolically. 46 Syed Hussain received much support from merchants of all origins based in Aceh. Trade with Aceh was crucial to the Settlement of Penang, which imported rice, paddy tin, pepper, rattan, and betel nuts from their neighboring polity, in exchange for piece goods from Europe and India such as opium, salt, and ammunition. 53 Relations between Aceh and the British government at Penang had steadily declined since 1807, when an EIC representative was expelled from Aceh by the king. 54 In 1808, King Jauhar Alam began to set up trade monopolies, thus displeasing prominent Penang merchants including Syed Hussain, who had enjoyed trading privileges in Aceh for decades, which included exemption from tax duties as a descendant of a former king and a wealthy merchant. 55 Syed Hussain, and some other merchants, adopted a different strategy. He decided to take control of Aceh instead. As a descendant of a former Acehnese king, he believed he had a valid claim to the throne. 59 Tensions further escalated between the EIC government and King Jauhar Alam in 1815, when the latter implemented a policy that prevented merchants sailing under English colors from trading freely at ports under his rule. 60 It became clear to the EIC that they, too, would benefit from having an ally in Aceh. Because direct intervention was not an option for EIC authorities, with little support from the Bengal government, Syed Hussain's ambition to dethrone Jauhar Alam functioned as a convenient proxy. In August 1815, Acehnese chiefs paved the way for Syed Hussain's "return" to this rightful throne as the descendant of a former king. With the help of a medley of "fighting men," consisting of EIC sepoys, Europeans, Malays, Bengalis, and "Arab lascars," 61 Syed Hussain sailed to Aceh under English colors with his son the following month. Events unfolded quickly from then on. Syed Hussain and his son were subsequently appointed "the great king" and "the little king," respectively. 62 However, instead of keeping the crown, he later installed his young son solely on the throne of Aceh. According to Captain Taylor based in Penang, Syed Hussain was "a man who might have been king of Aceh, but who preferred living under the protection of an English Government." 63 Nonetheless, it seemed that real power and control continued to lie in Syed Hussain's hands. During trial, Syed Hussain's son, Sayful Alam, was constantly referred to as the former, and rarely by name by witnesses and EIC legal officials. This implied that his father was the one responsible for most of the political dealings leading up to his royal ascension and after. 64 EIC correspondence revealed that Sayful Alam referred to himself as king and that even Governor William Petrie recognized him as such. 65 By September 1816, however, the new Governor of Penang, William Phillips, referred to Sayful Alam more tentatively as "present possessor of the yet disputed throne of Aceh" in his correspondence with other EIC officials. 66 In EIC court, Syed Hussain proved that he was adept at advancing arguments about the legality of his actions. He argued that he could not be accused of being seditious precisely because EIC authorities were complicit in all his alleged wrongdoings in the past. Before he sailed to Aceh in September 1815, he assuaged British fears of any potential violence in the Straits of Malacca that could be harmful to trade. He wrote to John MacInnes, who was also a translator for Governor William Petrie of Penang:
[M]y friends says that I cannot be permitted to equip a force in this port or make any preparations for hostility against the present king of Aceh.-Nothing can be more distant from my mind than any such design-I have no vessels of war, or any implements of war, for I am a mere merchant-my wish is only towards my trading vessels in such a manner, that if at sea they chanced to meet with any pirates they may be capable of defending themselves, I at present intend to proceeded to Aceh straight because there I have a sister whom I wish to visit and also to perform funeral rites at the tombs of my ancestors. . .I take nothing belonging to me saving my own person, to Aceh, my children, family and all my property being all left here under English colours, to the fastening shelter of which it is my own intention to return. Being a British subject, I shall in no respect deviate from the orders of Government, my reason for undertaking this Aceh business is to further the prosperity of Penang of which I am myself an inhabitant. 67 He diligently informed Governor William Petrie, his most ardent supporter in Penang of his plans to travel to Pedir on the east coast of Sumatra.
"When I went to Aceh I acquainted the Hon'ble William Petrie Governor of Pinang as well as the Governor . . .. the Governor in Council knew the whole and sent to examine my actions through the channel of the police magistrate and found no fault [with] me. I accordingly went and returned in two months and three days, having dated twenty three days at Aceh, and when my son had become Rajah I returned at Penang." 68 For his part, not surprisingly, Petrie would later be blamed for unnecessarily interfering with local politics in the region, 69 but at the time, Syed Hussain's calculated move to inform the governor certainly paid off. 70 
Decline of Other Legal Forums
To Syed Hussain's disappointment, the very jurisdiction that propelled him to success turned against him in 1816. He attempted to retreat to his own private jurisdiction, which he deemed to be his privilege as head of the Malay community. When the first lawsuit was brought against Syed Hussain in 1816 by two Indian merchants in a bid to compel him to pay his debts, he requested that the EIC government let the matter be settled outside of EIC court, as the case involved only Muslims. 71 His request was denied by the EIC Court of Judicature, mainly because the plaintiffs had voluntarily brought the case to the EIC court. In his petition to the Court of Judicature of Penang, Syed Hussain Aideed stressed that he had been "for many years under an express assurance from the English Government that his rights and privileges should be secured and that any differences of disputes which might at any time arise between him and other natives here should be decided according to the laws and customs of Mussulmen. He requested the court to "refer this matter to any four respectable Mohamedans in the Island, or to any four of the respectable men who whom this court may name. . . two to be named by the plaintiff and two by [him] , and that with their verdict, or judgment [he] is ready to abide." 73 Likewise, in a second case brought to English court in 1818 by two Chinese merchants whose vessel had been seized by Syed Hussain Aideed, the latter claimed that one of the principal witnesses was a Muslim who hoped to settle the case privately in a Muslim legal forum away from the eyes of the EIC court judges. 74 Syed Hussain maintained that his legal forum could arbitrate disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims. He was denied this right by the EIC court, which determined that not all parties involved were Muslim. EIC authorities cited his second clause that stated that disputes between non-Muslims should be arbitrated by EIC authorities, although Syed Hussain maintained that disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims lay within his jurisdiction.
Edmond Stanley declared that November 1816 that Syed Hussain was guilty of "treasonable and Piractical acts." 75 However, he admitted that "perhaps the court here was not a competent tribunal for trying offences of the nature the Syed was charged, with but it was his duty as a magistrate to take the necessary steps for making him appear to answer such charges at any other tribunal, it may afterwards be found expedient to send him to." 76 Edmond Stanley immediately deemed Syed Hussain a dangerous person who should remain in custody pending further investigation. Syed Hussain's fate was, however, redeemed by widespread public indignation at Stanley's decision. He received widespread support from other Penang merchants of all origins who clamored for his release in court, much to Stanley's frustration. They created such a ruckus during legal proceedings earlier that Stanley had to adjourn several times. Twenty-nine Arab, Malabar, and Malay inhabitants representing Syed Hussain and his family sent a petition to the governor requesting him to release Syed Hussain from jail on account of his old age and ill health. 77 The prominent opium merchant John Palmer of Calcutta wrote of the imprisonment of the "poor old Syed" to his fellow merchants in order to drive up sympathy for his friend. 78 Even Governor William Philips recognized that public opinion sided with Syed Hussain and recommended "that the restraint imposed (upon) him should be as mild, and as little injurious to the feelings of the individual and of his respectable connexions, and numerous adherents, as is compatible with the precision of the law." 79 Although the population of Penang was stratified according to ethnicity, merchants associated with Penang tended to be regarded as a collective whole, united by common business interests which usually involved trading in similar commodities while purposefully staving off the Dutch monopoly of trade in the region. A letter by King Jauhar Alam of Aceh to the governor of Penang referred to the five principal merchants of Penang collectively as "Carnegy Syed Hussain Mr Brown Mr Prince Wm Grant." 80 When the first committee was elected to manage funds for infrastructure in 1807, European and Asian representation was almost equal in number, which implied that European and Asian merchants were on equal footing in the settlement. 81 Because of pressure from local merchants, even the Superintendent of Police, Richard Caunter, was reluctant to hold Syed Hussain in custody. He urged the recorder to permit Syed Hussain to remain in his own house, under a guard, causing the latter to exclaim "I consider him the custody of the Law!" Although Stanley strongly felt that Syed Hussain should be detained in jail, government authorities believed that "the respectability of character, the rank, respect and influence, attached to him as the head of the Malay deputation not only on this island, but some degree the adjacent states meant that detention in jail would signal indelible dishonor that could cause serious political inconvenience." 82 77. They claimed that Syed Hussain had been afflicted with a bowel complaint. IOR/G/ 34/57, translation of a petition addressed to governor in council by Arab, Malabar, and Malay inhabitants of Penang, November 9, 1816 (FCCP November 14, 1816). Translated by W.J. Cracroft.
78. Palmer not only referred to court proceedings as "atrocious" but also believed one of the court's members was "unjust and oppressive. Subsequently, Syed Hussain was only detained in prison in Fort Cornwallis for a few days and did not receive further punishment for his transgressions. Upon his release on the morning of November 12, 1816, Syed Hussain wrote a letter to the governor telling him his family's distress and the utter disgrace he has experienced, especially when his circumstance had been "noised about in all the countries of the Malay Rajahs." 83 Clearly, his reputation had been sullied in the series of trials that began as a commercial lawsuit.
Immediately afterwards, Sir Edmond Stanley resigned from his post as recorder. 84 He had become deeply unpopular amongst merchants. The trials clearly revealed the cleavages among EIC authorities, specifically between legal authorities who generally opposed the merchant Syed Hussain's unencumbered actions, and executive government authorities who were more sympathetic to Syed Hussain, mindful of his worthy contributions of the colony as a whole since its inception as an EIC settlement in the 1780s. Evidently, even though the political ambitions of "merchant-rulers" were undermined by EIC legal authorities, their illustrious lineages still exerted some power over local subjects and merchants of various origins in the early nineteenth century. For that reason, Syed Hussain Aideed was never sent to a more "competent tribunal" (most probably a court in Bengal) as advised by Stanley. Instead, he was allowed to remain in Penang till his death in 1840. 85 
Conclusion
The trials of Syed Hussain spearheaded more intense EIC campaigns to monitor, and if possible, curb the authority of local rulers in the region. 85. His considerable property later helped to finance educational institutions in the Straits Settlements, such as the Singapore Institution and Penang Free School. The executors of his will were mortified, because the money was supposed to be for prayers and alms, but the Recorder of the Court, Sir William Norris disagreed. Even in death, judges did not see eye to eye with Syed Hussain. Buckley, An Anecdotal History, 714.
to be too volatile and risky for the EIC. When rival claimants to a single throne battled it out, the EIC hedged their bets on eventual victors. To the EIC's disappointment, Syed Hussain's interference in Aceh eventually resulted in a marked decline in commerce in the Straits of Malacca. 86 In tandem with the reduction in trade, the war engendered by the succession crisis caused a split in the Penang mercantile community between those who supported the deposed king in one camp and Syed Hussain's supporters in the other. 87 In order to restore the status quo in the Straits of Malacca, EIC authorities decided to rein in Syed Hussain's authority in Aceh.
Towards the tail end of his father's trial in 1821, Sayful Alam, requested more lenient treatment from the EIC government for his own role in the usurpation of the throne of Aceh. 88 Governor Phillips underscored that the authority of an English court of justice no longer depended either upon the will of the government or of the judges of the court, but was regulated by "the written law which law is above all other authority." Court judges, he stated, were now obliged to administer law "without distinction and without favor to high and low, to the rich as well as the poor." 89 By supporting certain rival claimants to multiple thrones in the region, competing royal genealogies were deliberately streamlined by the EIC. Legal practice was also streamlined in the process, as legal forums associated with these royal personages and other local authorities were either not recognized or phased out. EIC authorities emphasized Syed Hussain's second clause, that cases involving non-Muslims could not be tried in a Muslim legal forum. Syed Hussain, however, believed that quarrels between Muslims and non-Muslims could be tried in Muslim courts within his own jurisdiction. The EIC, by contrast, determined that Syed Hussain's highly specific laws only applied to Muslim inhabitants. As a result, his legal forums did not pertain to large swathes of the population. His four clauses were too specific, and incapable of general implementation. Since his legal forum could not form a tenable regional governance regime, his jurisdiction faded into irrelevancy, foreshadowing the subsequent contraction of other Malay kings' jurisdictions over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the region.
For most of the nineteenth century, legal enforcement was logistically impossible in the Straits of Malacca for any single authority including the EIC. 90 However, EIC officials, and later, British colonial officials, managed to chip away at the legal sovereignty exercised by local rulers. In March 1861, a civil case appeared in the EIC court of the Straits Settlements in Penang. The judge, Sir Peter Benson Maxwell ascertained that "[T]he Court has not now to consider and decide whether the Rajah (of Kedah) is such a sovereign prince as he claims himself to be, for it is not the truth of the plea which is now in question but its validity." 91 In order for the EIC "regional governance regime" to flourish in the Straits of Malacca, the EIC had to subordinate other networks and lock them out as soon as they became threatening to EIC aims to expand their trade in the region. This article demonstrates how these networks were undermined long before 1874, when British colonial officials were able to secure a firm footing in Malaya through the Pangkor Treaty that extended British control to most of the Malay Peninsula. Even in the absence of strong support from Bengal, the EIC officials in Penang embarked on semi-imperial efforts in the name of the firm through law. By catering to inhabitants of all origins, the EIC court filled the gap in jurisdiction, and, in the process, imposed a pervasive legality in the region.
The public trials of Syed Hussain Aideed in EIC courts were a watershed moment for the historical emergence of a system of legal pluralism in the Straits of Malacca dominated by the EIC. Syed Hussain Aideed, as the head of the Malay community, presided over his own separate jurisdiction, which was undermined by EIC authorities who refused to let him settle his commercial disputes within his own court. The gradual subversion of local independent jurisdictions within Penang directly led to the development of a plural legal system under the umbrella of English Common Law.
